GUIDE FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREWORD

In a world of "rising expectation," a vast array of social forces have been loosened which threaten the fabric of the status quo. Unfortunately, the governments and established power structures of many of the countries of the world are unable or unwilling to resolve conditions of unrest and poverty. These governments are vulnerable to insurgency.

Insurgency is revolutionary, guerrilla, political, and economic warfare aimed at the overthrow of existing authority, seizure of total power, and the establishment of a new social order. The insurgent leadership attempts to harness the forces of the society which have been already loosened and to exploit the vulnerabilities within the power structure.

The insurgent effort relies heavily on breaking the links between people and government or exploiting the non-existence of such links. It combines fear inducing terror with grievance exploitation and a promise of great socio-economic progress. In most cases such political behavior, in spite of these stated objectives to further the aspirations of the people, in fact opposes these goals and aspirations and ultimately manipulates the individual to subject himself completely to the revolutionary movement.

An early objective of the insurgent movement is to create a substructure of extra-legal government in the villages and urban centers of the target country. The initiation of this substructure requires only a small core of motivated cadre stressing clandestinity, organization, and mobility. Once the structure is developed, it supports the cadre core; providing food, manpower, and information. It asserts part-time authority and ultimately complete authority over the population in opposition to existing authority.

In establishing this authority, the insurgent force strives to cause a majority of the population to refuse support to their government even though they may not actively support the insurgents. Under such conditions, a minority of the population can overthrow the established government.

The insurgents use many techniques to establish control and to overthrow the government. These include armed harassment, assassination, ambush, and direct frontal assault as techniques of political violence. However, the bulk of the activity centers on other subversive techniques of a communication process which gradually weakens the government and its institutions. Through strikes, **protest** marches, and non-armed clashes, the insurgents may "topple" a government. The violence emphasizes the conflict or acts when necessary as the leverage for the subversive effort.

This guide is designed to provide a working knowledge of many variables which are related to the defeat of an insurgent system. As such, this guide discusses Internal Defense Programs and the related information gathering techniques which must be implemented to make Internal Defense workable. Part I outlines insurgent, government, and population factors. Part II discusses internal programs and information gathering techniques and Part III presents conclusions.

PART I - INSURGENT, GOVERNMENT, AND POPULATION FACTORS

A. FACTORS WHICH GUIDE THE INSURGENT

1. Felt Need

The restive or placid nature of any population group is directly related to the degree that that population group's felt needs are being met or frustrated. This is determined by the population's actual wants (food, clothing, housing, medicine, education) and their level of awareness or "rising expectations."

2. Fixed Blame

Any political force can be isolated from its population base if by implication or actual fact that political body appears to offer little or no assistance to the population in their efforts to meet their felt needs. A force seeking to usurp political power must necessarily convince a high percentage of the population that the existing government is unconcerned with the felt needs of the people.

3. Social Reform

A positive program is offered to meet the expressed and specific felt needs of a target population, and all necessary social reforms are promised to help meet those felt needs and correct the evils inherent in the present government. The total objective is to make the usurper more desirable to the populace than the existing government. (This approach is used by opposition political parties, subversives, and insurgents.)

4. Balance of Terror

An opposition force achieves limited terroristic control over the population by destroying the population's confidence in the ability of a government to provide for their protection. More importantly, an aura of legitimate resistance to the government is established. Terrorist action also hinders any effort of government to meet the felt needs of its population.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Leader Replacement

Within every population group there are potential leaders who are dissatisfied with existing conditions. With guidance and encouragement, these individuals can be manipulated to replace the existing leadership and to direct the inherited population toward new specific goals. The spotting, selection, recruitment, orientation, training, direction, and control of these potential leaders is the basis for obtaining and maintaining political control of any population group or nation.

B. FACTORS WHICH GUIDE THE GOVERNMENT

1. Credible Performance

Any government seeking to underwrite its viability must perpetually demonstrate to its population base that it is assisting the people to meet their felt needs. Furthermore, it is developing a responsible and dedicated bureaucracy that does evolve effective solutions to problems of importance and popular concern which matches the population's "rising expectations."

2. Avoidance of Blame

Every action must be taken to disprove any implication or evidence that the government offers little or no assistance to the population in their efforts to meet their felt needs. To avoid the eventuality of such blame, governments must have programs to identify and meet the felt needs of the population base. Governments cannot long hide or survive an indifference or ignorance of the felt needs of their populace.

3. Social Action

In the face of strong opposition, government must modify to its advantage and "champion" those social actions and reforms being advertised by opposition elements which

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

are viewed with popular acceptance. It is essential that the government clean its own house and correct the evils that come to public attention. If social reforms are needed to meet the felt needs of the population, then these reforms must be implemented to assure national stability and government viability.

4. Maintenance of Security

Any population seeks to attain or will support those groups who offer security from harassment, banditry, terrorism, acts of violence, and warfare. Any government is doomed that cannot provide for the security of its population. A government must therefore take positive action to destroy insurgent forces or other dissident elements.

5. Leader Development

The roots of government organization must extend to and cultivate local leaders to involve them in the decision making process and the daily activities of government. This will help to meet community problems as well as the felt needs of the population. Local leaders are essential to any government's communication and influence link with the population base. As such, leaders must be cultivated, developed, and supported so that their population followings develop a loyalty for the nation and government through their local leaders.

C. FACTORS WHICH GUIDE THE POPULATION

1. Recognition of Felt Needs

Every individual of a population group has basic wants for food, clothing, housing, medicine, education, and other needs at that level which meets the individual's awareness of his minimum requirements. Frustration and hostility develop when an individual or population group is unable to meet its felt needs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. Blame Frustration

In the past, if a population could not attain its felt needs, the blame was placed on the gods or the weather. Today, the existing government will usually receive the blame for its failure or inability to assist the people to meet their felt needs. (Resentment will further complicate the problem if government assistance violates local custom, culture, or the taboos of more primitive groups.)

3. Reform Phobia

Barriers to achievement of felt needs are generally affixed to the failure of government to implement social reforms which will provide land to the landless, improvements in health, education, credit, taxation, law, communication, transportation, and marketing. Advocates of social reform can rally a popular following that will grow in strength at a direct ratio to the economic and social frustrations in the country concerned. Social reform movements are the most common causes of change in the status quo.

4. Resistance to Terror

Populations who are not afforded security by their governments or who do not have the means for self-defense will accommodate themselves with any group eliciting their cooperation by force of arms. If caught between two opposing forces, a population may attempt to remain neutral, cooperate with both factions, or support that force posing the most immediate threat. In those cases where a government has neglected its obligation to help the people meet their felt needs, the population is not inclined to support government forces and may support any force opposing the government.

5. Local Leader Supremacy

Natural, hereditary, or elected leaders direct and control the populations within their village. Ethnic or religious groups look to their leaders for guidance since

- 4 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

they have little or no affinity toward regional or national political leaders unless such is developed by their own local leaders. Vast and divergent complexes of local leaders control the eventual fate of any nation.

<u>PART II - INTERNAL DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS AND RELATED INFORMATION TECHNIQUES</u>

<u>Approach:</u>

Much has been written on the methods and techniques of conducting insurgency and every insurgent participant has a choice of handbooks from which to choose his tactics. Part II of this Guide was written with the assumption that the reader has or can attain a basic knowledge of insurgency from the materials which are available.

Internal defense programs include social, economic, security, informational, propaganda, and political factors, which must be adjusted to specific situations and modified to counter the particular tactics used by an insurgent force.

The authors of this study have attempted to provide various checklists and techniques that will assist the planning, development, and activation of internal defense programs. Completion and employment of an Internal Defense plan will require meaningful advice and services of many different professionals within the nation concerned. It should be noted that the divergent nature of Internal Defense requires that its implementation be a combined and coordinated effort of all government agencies.

A. <u>ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL CHANGE IN RELATION TO INTERNAL DEFENSE</u>

　　1. <u>Traditional Attitude</u>

　　　　Only token efforts are made to meet the felt needs

of the deprived population mass. The traditional society and vested social and economic interests stagnate national development in an attempt to maintain the status quo. Such a traditional society is exposed to insurgency and unable to compete with any political force offering social change.

2. Social Attitude

Recognition of social responsibility on the part of dominant influence groups can signal a favorable attitude which will allow the government to offer social reforms and overall development programs. This can destroy the basis of insurgency support achieved through promises of improvement of harsh social and economic conditions. Under such an attitude a nation strives to educate and assist their population mass. The populace can then better provide for their own basic wants and felt needs with the help of responsible government and a stable political environment.

B. STEPS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO STRENGTHEN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1. Develop land, water, mineral, and other natural resources with an emphasis on private ownership.

2. Make large investments in education to improve human skills, managerial, and technical abilities.

3. Develop and diffuse technology for use by the population mass.

4. Initiate a technical revolution in agriculture to increase food production.

5. Develop industries to support the chemical and mechanical needs of agriculture and to provide needed consumer goods and exportable items.

6. Provide health services to improve worker production and population well being.

7. Encourage and assist family planning to prevent uncontrollable birth rates which can outstrip development progress.

8. Organize production and marketing incentives.

9. Develop public and private institutional services that:

    a. Conserve and improve natural resources.

    b. Increase knowledge of improved technology.

    c. Encourage capital formation and investments in agriculture and industry.

    d. Encourage savings at least to 10% of the national income.

    e. Provide development and production credit at reasonable terms.

    f. Assure the population a fair share of the economic benefits of increased production.

10. Build up capital for and develop transportation, communication, power, and utilities.

11. Provide a favorable climate for entrepreneurs, and investors.

12. Assume basic social welfare responsibilities.

13. Encourage political stability by achieving non-violent means to implement changes in government.

- 7 -

C. ADVERSE CONDITIONS AFFECTING INTERNAL DEFENSE

Item	Condition	Effect
Land Tenure	Limited Private Ownership	Popular Demand for Land Reform
Transportation	Poorly Developed	Isolation of Rural Areas
Communication	Extensive Only in Urban Centers	Information Gap Between Government and the Rural Mass
Local Leaders	Negligible Participation in the Government Decision making Process	Disaffection with Government
Education	Limited Opportunities for the Population Mass	Impedes Social and Economic Development
Minorities	Segregated Ethnic, Religious, or Social Groups	Creates National Disunity and Disaffected Population Groups
Medical	Limited Services	Frustration and Antagonism Toward Government
Law	Tolerance of Bureaucratic Corruption and Favoritism of Elite Groups	Popular Disrespect for All Law Enforcement

- 8 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Item	Condition	Effect
Agriculture	Technological Lag	Reduces the Capability of a Growing Population to Provide for its own Food Supply
Industry	Impeded Growth	Surplus Population is Condemned to Poverty and General Discontent, Urban slums Expand
Marketing	Poorly Developed	Deprives the Producer of Profit Motivation
Credit	Non-Available or Available at Excessive Interest Rates	Restricts Individual Economic Self-Improvement
Housing	Substandard for Poverty Groups	Alienation from the National Society
Individual Income	Insufficient for a Minimum Standard of Living	Perpetuates Poverty and Population Unrest
Private Sector Organization	Limited Development of Unions, Cooperatives, Community Groups, etc.	Population Lacks the Organized Means to Improve Their Social and Economic Conditions
Security	Population Groups Lack the Means for Defense or Self-Defense	Terrorist Control May be Imposed over the Population by Insurgent Forces

- 9 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Item	Condition	Effect
Democratic Process	Does Not Exist (Government is Imposed Without the Consent of the Governed)	Violent Means must Eventually be Employed to Change the Government When it becomes Intolerable
Government	Parasitic With Little Intention of Improving the Social or Economic Conditions of the Population Mass	Popular Disaffection with Government

D. CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO INTERNAL DEFENSE

1. Government is honest, responsible, and concerned with its image.

2. The government is responsive to the wants and felt needs of the people.

3. Local leaders are cultivated, queried as to the needs of their groups, and involved in the government decision making process.

4. The government and people are of one mind--to build a viable nation free of poverty.

5. There is policy accord at all levels of government.

6. There are institutional programs focused on meeting grass-roots socio-economic needs.

7. Government is not paternalistic and the people are involved in their own self-government.

8. Needed and urgent programs receive adequate logistical, manpower, and financial support.

- 10 -

CONFIDENTIAL

9. The population is aware that government programs are providing as much, or more than, any opposition group could deliver.

10. Non-violent means exist to implement changes in government.

11. Minority groups are being absorbed into the national mainstream of life.

12. Security forces have the confidence, trust, and respect of the population.

13. The people have confidence in the ability of security forces to protect them from all hostile acts against family, home, and community.

14. Security forces do not poach on the population, annoy their women, or violate group traditions and customs.

15. Military and police forces are active in civic action type programs to assist in meeting priority needs of the population.

16. The people are responsive to the assistance provided by security forces and in return help to identify and destroy subversive elements.

17. There is an organized reporting and communication system that provides an alert to insurgent activity in any community.

18. Government mechanisms exist to collect, collate, and act upon all information concerning insurgent activity at the village level.

E. FACTORS RELATED TO LEADER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

1. Individuals named by a group as leader.

- 11 -

2. Individuals who exercise the most influence on group members.

3. Individuals who aspire to leadership roles.

4. Attitudes, perception, goals, education, religion, custom, and culture of the leader.

5. External influences on the leader and leader acceptance or resentment of these external influences.

6. Leader acceptance of new ideas and rating of leader effectiveness.

7. Leader motivation.

8. Leader sex, age, height, weight, physique, etc.

9. Economic, social, and marital status of the leader.

10. Leader involvement in the government decision making process.

11. Communication channels between leaders and government or insurgents.

12. Government and/or insurgent response to leader requests for assistance.

13. Leader involvement in government development and/or security program.

14. Leader reaction and response in providing the government with information on insurgent activities among his group.

15. Leader acceptance of training and guidance from government representatives.

- 12 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE

The most intensive economic, social, and political efforts will usually fail without security. Insurgent terrorism causes the affected populace to disassociate itself from the government and its programs. Individuals will seek to protect themselves and their families or seek an accommodation with the insurgents.

Security efforts require the active cooperation of the government and of all population groups. Active developmental efforts, civic action, and social programs sponsored by the government must motivate the people to resist, identify, and inform on insurgent forces. Most important, the people must be convinced that the government is worth supporting.

A motivated population will deny food, manpower, and information to insurgent forces if they are given the arms and training for their own self-defense and if there is an immediate availability of security forces to assist the local inhabitants to meet the threat of superior insurgent forces.

Security forces must be provided with training, funds, manpower, arms, transportation, communication, and other essentials that will allow rapid deployment in the defense of any community, or to seek out and destroy insurgent forces.

Unarmed population groups should be instructed in the following defense techniques:

  1. Organization of alert committees to patrol the city block or observe the village trail to provide advance warning of the approach of insurgent forces.

  2. Deployment of runner or electronic communication systems to request security forces to react quickly against insurgents.

  3. Community population control to provide an alert to infiltration and exfiltration of insurgents.

- 13 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Hiding of food, livestock, and other valuables to prevent ready availability to the insurgents.

5. Organized retreat and evading insurgent forces until they are driven away.

Note: Security efforts can be effective only when they are based on information which identifies the insurgents and their activities so that appropriate action may be taken against them.

G. INTERNAL DEFENSE INFORMATION CENTERS

The basic function of an information center is to collect and collate information on insurgent personalities and their activities, to assist various security services to take timely and appropriate action to counter insurgent activities, and to provide information which can increase the effectiveness of the nation's internal defense plan.

Operations of an Information Center

1. Collecting and filing biographic data on important local leaders and insurgent personalities.

2. Maintenance of incident reports and maps which detail the location and objectives of various insurgent actions.

3. Recording of all information reports with a record of sources and reliability of facts.

4. Mapping of all rumor reports with a listing of probable sources and a record of what rumors were proven by fact or incident.

5. Collation and analysis of grievance reports to identify specific frustration and antagonism toward the government and the reasons therefor.

- 14 -

6. Dissemination of problem reports to various government agencies recommending a need for social, economic, security, and political action in defined geographic areas or among particular population groups.

7. Rapid electronic communication of priority information to appropriate action agencies.

8. Coordination and liaison with military, police, and civil information services.

9. Collection of information not available from other sources.

10. Issuing of public statements to counter the insurgents' false information and propaganda.

H. <u>INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS</u>

1. What are the basic wants and needs of the population mass?

2. What are the popular grievances against the government?

3. Who are the local leaders and to whom do they owe their loyalty?

4. Do local leaders communicate their problems to government authorities?

5. What government programs, activities, and personalities are represented in the various local communities? (What is the local attitude toward each?)

6. How are local security forces regarded?

7. Is government respected and thought to be honest at the local level?

- 15 -

8. Do all elements of the population understand the purpose and need for **conscription and taxation?**

9. What is the attitude toward the existing system of law and order?

10. Is the population organized to assist its own self-improvement through cooperatives and other similar organizations?

11. How does the local populace regard present system of land tenure?

12. Is agricultural production information available to local farmers?

13. What is the status of credit and marketing institutions?

14. What educational opportunities are available?

15. To what extent has industry or cottage industry been developed?

16. Are medical or first aid services available at the local level?

17. What areas are isolated due to inadequate transportation?

18. What is the rate of unemployment?

19. What is the nature and extent of poverty?

20. Are minority groups being absorbed into the national society?

21. Do rural areas have adequate communication ties to urban or government centers?

22. Has a village census been taken?

- 16 -

23. Have identification cards been issued?

24. Who is missing from villages and what is their present location?

25. What personalities are known to support anti-government activities?

26. Who are the insurgent personalities?

27. Where and when did insurgent forces conduct their activities?

28. Who supports the insurgents and how is this support provided?

29. Who is knowledgeable of insurgent activities and how do they obtain their information?

30. Why do various groups or individuals support the insurgents?

31. How are insurgents recruited and what is their motivation?

32. What training is given to insurgent recruits and cadre? Where and when is it given?

33. What is the nature and method of insurgent clandestine activities?

34. What transportation and communication are employed by the insurgents?

35. How do the insurgents obtain arms, ammunition, food, manpower, and information?

36. Have the insurgents organized an extra-legal government and/or front movement?

- 17 -

37. Do government security forces have the training, manpower, funds, mobility, arms, communication, and general capability to locate and destroy insurgent forces?

* Compare the answers to the above questions with the list of Adverse Conditions Affecting Internal Defense and the list of Conditions Favorable to Internal Defense.

I. INFORMATION COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

1. Screen the following readily available materials:

   a. Government and private project reports
   b. Survey and economic reports
   c. Census reports
   d. Newspapers
   e. Magazines
   f. Trade journals
   g. Bulletin **boards**
   h. Tax reports
   i. Market gossip
   j. Hospital and police records
   k. Customs and passport records
   l. Union and student publications
   m. Local and foreign radio broadcasts
   n. Depositories of waste paper
   o. Insurgent propaganda and publications.

2. Organize a suggestion box program that will encourage restive population groups to pass on information concerning their grievances, felt needs, frustrations, and dangers to their security The suggestions may be anonymous to avoid fear of retaliation. Pictorial suggestion guides should be provided to populations with a high illiteracy rate.

- 18 -

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Local survey teams may be formed on the local or provincial level to elicit answers to the questions presented under the "Information Requirements for Internal Defense Programs." Such survey teams must develop a basis for rapport among the population groups from whom they seek answers. Therefore, civic action type programs or similar approaches may become the means or mechanism by which they collect their information. If insurgent forces are present, it may be necessary for survey teams to receive arms and training to develop a counterguerrilla capability.

4. Informant nets may be formed in each city block, union hall, university campus, and rural village. Trained cadre, who are not identified to the populace, should be used to covertly identify, recruit, and train informants. A covert approach is required to prevent the informants from being killed by the insurgents. Out of every population group there are individuals who will act as informants because they (1) recognize the false promises of the insurgents, (2) are antagonized by the insurgents, (3) have patriotism for the nation or government, (4) are appreciative of government efforts and programs, (5) enjoy a special relationship with the government cadre, (6) are motivated by gifts or monetary reward, or (7) are motivated by a combination of factors.

5. Electronic and physical surveillance.

6. Professional interrogation of captured insurgents and personnel supporting insurgent activities.

7. Interception of insurgent communications and access to, or capture of, documents.

8. Infiltration of the insurgent movement and organizations.

- 19 -

J.   POLITICAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE

All states seeking innoculation from unrest and in-
surgency are compelled to create institutional processes
which involve the population mass in the government decision
making process, and the direction of those educational,
social, and economic organizations which relate directly
with the achievement of population aspirations.

Political organization may be seen in any effort which
affords a population with institutional opportunities to
change administered frustration which they know is not an
unalterable part of life's travail. Even tyrannies with
futuristic methods of thought control must face the fact
that it is a basic human impulse for the individual to
assert himself to attempt to achieve his basic wants.

With the rise in "expectations," men come to demand more
and more of their institution--and with greater intransigence.
When existing institutions are sluggish in meeting population
felt needs, demands for instant performance lead to instant
disillusionment of government, political mechansims, educatioral
systems, social and economic organizations. There is a built-
in and unavoidable thrust to destroy those institutions that
have failed the population in their hour of need.

The great danger to a nation's security is that the
vested interests of the men who have created its institutions
often appear to be endangered by change. It is for this
reason that institutions attempt to perpetuate the status quo
and prevent the achievement of human aspirations that can be
met only by flexible, adaptive, and self-renewing organiza-
tional process.

Insurgency thrives on the inability of a nation to adapt
existing institutions or create new means to provide the
population mass with the hope of achieving their aspirations
without resort to violent means. To this end, unions, co-
operatives, parent-teacher organizations, youth groups, and
other institutions are just as important as government
bureaucracy, political parties, or democratic process.

- 20 -

K. PUBLIC INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

1. The populace must be well informed of insurgent
    activities, concepts, objectives, and modus
    operandi before they can come to "grips" with
    the dangers posed by the insurgents.

2. Government assistance programs must be explained
    and made known to the population mass to prevent
    the people from believing that the government is
    doing little or nothing in their interest.

3. It is essential that the public be advised on
    means to organize themselves to improve their
    own self-help efforts.

4. Insurgents dis-information campaigns must be
    countered with government information campaigns.
    Insurgent propaganda must be countered with
    government propaganda.

5. Government must use informational media to elicit
    population cooperation for national development
    and counterinsurgency programs.

6. The public must be advised of ways and means to
    resist insurgent terrorism.

7. Informational techniques must encourage and
    develop attitudes of national unity and
    patriotism.

8. Publications and radio programs should demonstrate
    the government's concern with helping the people to
    meet their felt needs. For example, market reports,
    farming tips, health information, and radio schools
    of the "air" can be potent weapons against the
    insurgents.

9. The populace must be well informed on government
    programs and successes in defeating the insurgents.

- 21 -

10. Advice and assistance should be provided on various non-violent means to initiate changes to discredit the purpose and need for violent change via insurgency.

L. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE

Skilled and dedicated administrators will be required to plan, implement, expedite, update, review, and assure the continuity of programs. Administrators must have divergent backgrounds which allow a comprehensive insight into the social, economic, political, security, and informational requirements essential to the internal defense program.

Individuals who understand basic social problems will be required to recommend needed social changes and advice on the implementation of legal and institutional processes which will create non-violent means to achieve such social change. Personnel who should be involved in social planning include sociologists, lawyers, educators, community leaders, union organizers, cooperative advisors, and institutional specialists.

In the economic area "key" personnel include economists, savings and credit managers, agricultural researchers and technicians, extension educationalists, cottage industry and industrial planners, and marketing experts. Such personnel must have the technical and managerial capability to provide a growing population with the means to provide for its own food supply and develop industry which can support the chemical and mechanical needs of agriculture, provide needed consumer goods and export items.

Personnel for security efforts may include military and police conscripts, but the basic need is for well motivated (volunteer) professional police and military career cadre who have the disposition to achieve the confidence of the people while destroying insurgent forces. Basic skill requirements include hunters, trackers, jungle experts, counterguerrilla tacticians, interrogators, communicators, transportation specialists, intelligence and counterintelligence officers,

- 22 -

Propagandists and civic action experts. A high percentage of security personnel should be indigenous to the areas in which they operate because of the need for development of rapport with local populations.

Information programs succeed or fail depending on the ability of personnel to accurately collect, collate, and disseminate details on population unrest and/or the insurgents and their activities. These broad based skill requirements for information personnel demand expertise in survey techniques, elicitation of information, covert organization of informant nets, communication, mapping, filing, reports writing, analysis of information, biographic data collection, liaison, etc. Information reports must include an analysis of actions needed to resolve popular grievances and to counter insurgent activities. These must be brought to the attention of the appropriate action agencies at the speed dictated by the priority of the situation.

A character sketch of desirable personnel for internal defense programs is as follows:

    1. Adaptable, flexible, unprejudiced and people oriented.

    2. Non-paternalistic with a conviction that the critical needs of restive population groups must be met via government aided self-help programs which consider the genus and traditions of the populace concerned.

    3. Career commitment to a vocation related to internal defense, i.e., social, economic, security, political, or informational vocations.

    4. Advanced training in a vocational area or areas.

    5. Incorruptible with no vested interest in the perpetuation of an institution or elite group that would hamper development of the internal defense plan.

    6. Dedicated to the defeat of insurgent forces and the conditions of poverty and ethnic friction upon which such forces thrive.

- 23 -

PART III - CONCLUSIONS

The many facets of internal defense are important in that each has its specific relationship to an insurgency situation. Internal defense, however, is not automatically achieved because a government has a strong military force, a nation-building program, a people winning effort, or any other combination of activities related to any of the social, economic, security, political, informational, and institutional factors. Each of these factors must be considered in their proper perspective as they relate to each specific insurgency.

A common fallacy is for governments to apply military force and to create programs of internal defense from the resources which they have the most of. Another problem is seen in the tendency to provide inputs purely on the basis of preferential treatment of agencies and groups that have the loudest "voice" or the greatest political "muscle." All factors must be considered and a balanced program developed if the internal defense effort is to defeat the insurgents.

Internal defense cannot be achieved unless a government maintains accurate and timely surveillance of what is going on in the nation it represents. Details of an insurgency have to be overtly and covertly "ferreted out" to prevent the insurgents from hiding behind a number of social, economic, institutional, and other problems which may be unmanageable as a part of any overall internal defense program.

Action programs suggested in this guide should not be conducted for their own sake but developed as required to achieve a means to an end--internal defense. On this basis there are five questions that should be asked of all programs:

1. Does it raise the cost of insurgent operations?

2. Does it erode support to insurgent forces and reduce their productivity?

- 24 -

3. Is the credibility and value of the rebellion's product reduced?

4. Are insurgents defecting and/or being destroyed?

5. Are the conditions which bred the insurgency being eliminated?